Prior to the 2021 elections, the government tried to discredit Wine’s People Power movement by framing it as a violent group despite its insistence on non-violent methods. In 2018, new opposition leader Bobi Wine was charged with treason and the illegal possession of firearms. In 2006, for example, opposition leader Kizza Besigye was hit with trumped up treason charges for alleged links to the shadowy People’s Redemption Army (PRA) rebel group before the case was quashed by the Constitutional Court. This situation has not been helped by the government’s record of deception. For instance, it is telling that despite IS claiming responsibility for the recent attacks, conspiracy theories about state involvement still abound. Such crackdowns have fuelled a widespread suspicion of the government, so much that whenever violence occurs, the first suspect – in the public psyche – is the state itself. Following the January 2021 election, they engaged in the mass kidnap and torture of opposition activists. In November 2020, for instance, security forces killed several peaceful protesters. For decades, the government has systematically persecuted its political opponents, and on a larger scale and at a greater intensity to rebel attacks. To many Ugandans, the recent ADF attacks were shocking, but not dissimilar to the brutality of state repression.
The violence, corruption, and incompetence typical of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) have created a growing divide between the state and its people while creating conditions conducive for insecurity to thrive. In this regard, Uganda is particularly illustrative. Looking at “terrorism” separately from its socio-political context has resulted in an excessive focus on security measures at the expense of discussing the wider political restructuring that would arguably be more meaningful in combatting the threat. However, the pre-occupation with the security dimension of the problem has tended to obscure its political dimension, which is equally – if not more – significant. A versatile and growing security threat that traverses borders does indeed require a strong, agile and collective response from regional players. This impulse is understandable given the upsurge in ADF attacks and the purported connections with IS.
Most analysis of the latest developments has tended to focus on the allegedly growing risk of militant Islamism in the region, the prospects of the new joint military offensive, and the need for stronger regional cooperation in intelligence. Though the extent of this association is contested, IS claimed responsibility for the most recent Kampala attacks. In 2019, it pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (IS). The ADF began as local rebel group in Uganda before relocating to eastern Congo, where it has wreaked havoc while also staging occasional attacks in Uganda. The move follows last month’s bombings in Uganda’s capital Kampala as well as general growing insecurity, which the government attributes to the militants. Credit: Paul Kagame.Įarlier this month, Ugandan troops entered the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and commenced a joint military offensive with the Congolese army against the rebel Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). President Yoweri Museveni has been in power in Uganda since 1986.